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NOTES
COMMUNITY PROPERTY - ERROR OF LAW AS TO NATURE OF
FUNDS USED IN PURCHASE OF SEPARATE PROPERTY
When plaintiff purchased a one-half interest in her father's
plantation in 1944, the act of sale fully disclosed her intention
to acquire the property with her paraphernal funds, for the
benefit of her separate estate, subject to her separate manage-
ment. In 1947, by an act of sale containing similar recitals,
plaintiff joined with her father to sell the major part of the
plantation to Alice C. Plantation & Refinery, Inc.,1 plaintiff and
her father retaining a three-fourths mineral interest. In the
instant case plaintiff sought to have her share of the mineral
interest and the remaining portion of the land purchased in 1944
declared her separate and paraphernal property. The question
whether this property is community or separate arises from the
interaction of three factors: (1) plaintiff's purchase from her
father was entirely on credit with the purchase price secured
by mortgage notes; (2) two of these notes were cancelled
against plaintiff's share of the proceeds from the operation of
the plantation ;2 (3) plaintiff never filed- in accordance with
Civil Code article 2386 -the formal act reserving the proceeds
from her separate property to the benefit of her separate estate,
with the result that these revenues fell into the community.3 The
1. In this suit for a declaratory judgment, brought :by plaintiff individually
and as executrix of her husband's succession, both Alice C. and the minor chil-
dren of the marriage were joined as defendants. Plaintiff's appeal individually
from the trial court's judgment converted the case on appeal into a contest be-
tween the plaintiff individually, and the husband's succession and the minor chil-
dren. In the trial court, the minors had contended that the sale to Alice C. was
invalid as a sale of community property by a wife, but the trial court sustained
two of Alice C.'s alternative defenses that even if the property had been com-
munity Alice C. acquired a valid title: (1) because plaintiff's husband inter-
vened in and signed the sale, thus constituting the wife agent of the community
(see Garlick v. Dalbey, 147 La. 18, 84 So. 441 (1919) ; Kenner v. Leon Godchaux
Co., 52 La. Ann. 965, 27 So. 542 (1900)) ; and (2) Alice C. acquired a valid title
through the acquisitive prescription of ten years. Contentions as to validity of
Alice C.'s title were not pressed on appeal.
2. In 1946 the $25,000 note and accrued interest was charged against funds
held by the father representing plaintiff's share of the profits of the operation
of the plantation. In 1952 the $25,000 note was charged against some $37,000
advanced by plaintiff and her husband to the father's executrix, to expedite the
settlement of the father's succession. From counsel for plaintiff it was learned
that plaintiff's husband contributed $5,000 of this, and the balance was advanced
by plaintiff from the income from the plantation and other property.
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2386 (1870) : "The fruits of the paraphernal property
of the wife, wherever the property be located and however administered, whether
[648)
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district court ruled that the property retained from the 1947
sale to defendant corporation was community property, since it
had been paid for with community funds -plaintiff's portion
of the plantation's revenues. The First Circuit Court of Appeal
reversed. Held, an error of law as to the status of the planta-
tion revenues vitiated all consent to payments made with those
funds; therefore there were never any payments made on the
property, and it remains the separate property of the plaintiff
subject to payment of the price. Bailey v. Alice C. Plantation &
Refinery, Inc., 152 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
Under Louisiana's community property system all purchases
made during the community are presumed to fall into the com-
munity.4 As to purchases made by the husband, this presump-
tion is conclusive unless the act of sale recites and the husband
is able to prove that the property was acquired with his separ-
ate funds and for his separate estate. 5 The wife may establish
property as paraphernal without such recitals in the act of sale,
natural, civil, including interest, dividends and rents, or from the result of labor,
fall into the conjugal partnership, if there exists a community of acquets and
gains; unless the wife, by written instrument, shall declare that she reserves all
of such fruits for her own separate use and benefit and her intention to admin-
ister such property separately and alone. The said instrument shall be executed
before a Notary Public and two witnesses and duly recorded in the Conveyance
Records of the Parish where the community is domiciled.
"If there is no community of gains, each party enjoys, as he chooses, that
which comes to his hand; but the fruits and revenues which are existing at the
dissolution of the marriage, belong to the owner of the things which produce them.
(As amended by Acts 1944, No. 286.)"
See Slater v. Culpepper, 129 So. 2d 499 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Smith v.
Smith, 117 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) ; Matthews v. Hansberry, 71 So. 2d
232 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954).
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870): "The property of married persons is
divided into separate and common property ...
"Common property is that which is acquired by the husband and wife during
marriage, in any manner [other than those specified] . . . . (As amended by
Acts 1920, No. 186.)"
Id. art. 2402: "This partnership or community consists of the profits of all
the effects of which the husband has the administration and enjoyment, either of
right or in fact, of the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both hus-
band and wife, and of the estate which they may acquire during the marriage,
either by donations made jointly to them both, or by purchase, or in any other
similar way . . . . (As amended by Acts 1902, No. 68.)"
See Vincent v. Superior Oil Co., 178 F. Supp. 276 (W.D. La. 1959) ; Prince
v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So. 2d 128 (1956) ; Thomas v. Winsey, 76 So. 2d 33
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
5. Pearlstine v. Mattes, 223 La. 1032, 67 So. 2d 582 (1953) ; Slaton v. King,
214 La. 89, 36 So. 2d 648 (1948) and cases cited therein. See Bruyninckx v.
Woodward, 217 La. 736, 751, 47 So. 2d 478, 483 (1950) : "[D]espite the double
declaration, there was a presumption that the property belonged to the community
as it was acquired during the marriage .... And this presumption has not been
rebutted by [the heirs of the husband]." To the same effect, Lazaro v. Lazaro,
92 So. 2d 402, 404 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957) ; Sharp v. Zeller, 110 La. 61, 34 So.
129 (1902). After giving the double declaration the court considered whether
the funds used had become community funds through use for community purposes.
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but she must be able to show by clear proof that the property
was purchased with her separate funds, for her separate estate,
and was to be under her separate management. 6 When the issue
of separateness is presented before full payment, the wife who
purchased on credit must demonstrate that she had sufficient
paraphernal funds for there to be a reasonable expectation of
full payment from her separate funds.7 If it is later shown that
she in fact used community funds in payment of the price, the
property will be community property.8 Since the revenues from
the wife's separate property are community property unless she
has filed the declaration of paraphernality required by article
2386, a wife using such proceeds to satisfy the credit portion of
6. Southwest Natural Production Co. v. Anderson, 239 La. 490, 118 So. 2d
897 (1960) ; Succession of Blades, 127 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961);
Joseph v. Travis, 99 So. 2d 548 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957) ; Morgan v. Hathaway,
77 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954). See also Note, 15 LA. L. REV. 467
(1955).
7. In Bailey, 152 So. 2d at 338 the court quotes from Fortier v. Barry, 111
La. 776, 779, 35 So. 900, 901 (1904), wherein the test is stated: "[W]here the
wife claims it as separate estate, the burden rests on her to establish, by proof
dehors the recitals of the act by which it has been acquired, (1) the possession
of some paraphernal funds under her administration, and available for investment,
(2) that the cash portion of the price bears such a relation to the whole as to
make the property purchased sufficient security for the credit portion, and (3)
that her paraphernal property and revenues are such as to enable her to make
the purchase with reasonable expectation of meeting the deferred payments." In
connection with the test quoted above, the later case of Lotz v. Citizens Bank &
Trust Co., 17 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944) said that where the purchase
was entirely on credit, there was an even greater burden placed on the party
seeking to establish the separate title to the property. The court in Bailey took
the Lotz holding as meaning that the property must be security for itself in all-
credit transactions.
8. Perhaps the Bailey case could be cited as authority for his proposition, but
this point was conceded by the plaintiff. No other cases were found wherein,
after considering the test for credit purchases, the court later was required to
look at actual payments made on the property. However, it is well settled that
use of community funds wil render the purchased property part of the com-
munity: Succession of Schnitter, 220 La. 323, 56 So. 2d 563 (1952) ; Betz v.
Riviere, 211 La. 43, 29 So. 2d 465 (1947) ; Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148
So. 37 (1933) ; Fluery v. Fluery, 131 So. 2d 355 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961);
and other cases cited in Bailey, 152 So. 2d at 340. In Succession of Schnitter,
most clearly in point here, there is no indication of whether the purchase was on
credit; however, the court found that $2,500 of a $2,800 purchase price were
clearly paid from the separate funds of the wife. However, since there was no
showing that the remainder was from separate funds, the presumption was that
these were community funds and therefore the purchase was held to be community
property.
Possibly there is some question whether the use of the community funds
actually "converts" the title to the property from the separate estate of one
spouse to the community. Many of the cases referred to above consider the evi-
dence in light of the necessity of overcoming the presumption that property is
purchased for the community; a finding that community funds were used, while:
effectually placing title in the community, might be only a ruling that the pre-
sumption had not been overcome. Note that if there is a true "conversion," title
would seem to vest in the community at that time; if there is a "failure to over-
come the presumption" presumably title would have been in the community from
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the purchase price must comply with that article to establish
the purchase as part of her separate estate?
In the instant case plaintiff had not complied with article
2386 and payment had been effected by crediting the revenues
from the separate property against the notes. Nevertheless, the
court ruled that the property retained the separate character
intended at the time of purchase. First, the court held that the
notes had not been paid through compensation by effect of law.
For compensation to be operative there must be a mutuality of
indebtedness, i.e., a standing-in-debt between the same two par-
the date of acquisition. The instant case conceded that "conversion" would take
place, and no square ruling was found which determined the proper approach.
9. Prior to the 1944 amendment to article 2386 whether fruits from the wife's
separate property were separate or not depended on the often hard-to-establish
fact of who administered the property. Trorlicht v. Collector of Revenue, 25
So. 2d 547, 551 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946) : "(The 1944 amendment to article
2386] seems to us to evidence nothing more than a realization by the legisla-
tors of the fact that there may often be doubt as to how and by whom a wife's
separate estate is administered and possibly a realization of the fact that in all
fairness the fruits of a wife's separate property should go to the community
unless she expressly declares that she does not desire this result." See also Mat-
thews v. Hansberry, 71 So. 2d 232, 235 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954). By the
amendment there is some alleviation of these problems since the wife can insure
that the fruits will be community property merely by not filing the required
declaration. While this is a considerable aid to those persons desiring, principally
for tax purposes, that such revenues accrue to the community, the amendment's
aid to the wife interested in maintaining these revenues as her separate property
is somewhat doubtful. While it is clear that failure to file the declaration will
be conclusive against the wife, it is not at all clear whether, even if the declara-
tion has been filed, the wife alleging the separate nature of these revenues would
still have to show separate administration of the property. A decision holding
this to be the case would maintain the community system inviolate: the parties,
if they so desire, can insure these revenues to the benefit of the community by
the simple expedient of not filing the declarations; again, if the wife desires to
maintain these funds for her separate estate she may do so by filing the declara-
tion of paraphernality and then administering the property in such fashion as to
prevent possible confusion of this separate property with that of the community.
Such a result seems in line with the traditional French doctrine of individual
freedom in contracting and the pre-1944 jurisprudence, which, it is arguable, was
so well established that the legislature would not have attempted to overturn it
without specific language to that end.
Before 1944 article 2386 read: "When the paraphernal property is adminis-
tered by the husband, or by him and the wife indifferently, the fruits of his
property, whether natural, civil, or the result of labor, belong to the conjugal
partnership, if there exists a community of gains. If there do not, each party
enjoys, as he chooses, that which comes to his hand, but the fruits and revenues
which are existing at the dissolution of the marriage belong to the owner of the
thing which produced them."
While the article refers specifically to the paraphernal property of the hus-
band, the same rule applied to the wife's separate property which was admin-.
istered by the husband, or both indifferently. See Lazard v. C.I.R., 153 F.2d 348
(5th Cir. 1946) ; C.I.R. v. Hyman, 135 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1943) ; Lucas v. C.I.R.,:
134 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1943); Trorlicht v. Collector of Revenue, 25 So. 2d 547
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946) ; K. & M. Store v. Lewis, 22 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1945).
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ties.10 The court pointed out that there was no mutuality in this
case since the debt for the purchase price of the plantation was
owed by the plaintiff in her separate capacity; but, since no dec-
laration of paraphernality had been filed, the proceeds from the
operation of the plantation (and later the mineral interest) con-
stituted a debt owed to the community existing between plain-
tiff and her husband.
Second, the court held that there had been no payment, for
an error of law vitiated plaintiff's consent to the use of the
plantation revenues in paying the debt she owed separately. The
error derived from plaintiff's ignorance regarding the operation
of article 2386; she believed the funds to be separate when in
fact they were community. Under Civil Code article 1846 (3),11
this error enabled plaintiff to avoid the payments made with the
community property. Thus, in contemplation of law there had
been no actual payment of the mortgage notes. Consequently,
as the property was proved to be separate at the time of acquisi-
tion and no payments had been made since then to alter that
status, plaintiff's interest in the plantation remained part of
her separate and paraphernal property, although she still owed
the full purchase price.
While the court gave full effect to the plaintiff's failure to
comply with article 2386, it avoided the traditional concept that
use of community funds constitutes the property purchased com-
munity property. In avoiding such a result the court relied on
an error of law which did not concern the debt itself, but more
remotely the legal nature of the revenues used to discharge it.
With other recent decisions 12 the instant case stands as an ex-
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2207 (1870) : "When two persons are indebted to
each other, there takes place between them a compensation that extinguished
both the debts . .. ."
Id. art. 2208: [T]he two debts are reciprocally extinguished, as soon as they
exist simultaneously, to the amount of their respective sums."
11. Id. art. 1846: "3. Error of law can never be alleged as the means of ac-
quiring, though it may be invoked as the means of preventing loss or of recover-
ing what has been given or paid under such error .... "
12. In Graves v. United States Rubber Co., 237 La. 505, 111 So. 2d 752
(1959) the court in an almost "all fours" case held that the purchase was made
from capital assets earned before the marriage and not with fruits of those assets
which would have fallen prey to article 2386. An analogous situation may be
found in that group of cases holding that the sale of paraphernal property to a
building and loan association by a wife, and the subsequent resale to the husband
and wife dose not convert the property from separate to community, even though
the transfers are held to be true sales. See Capillon v. Chambliss, 211 La. 1, 18,
29 So. 2d 171, 176 (1946) ; Mayre v. Pierson, 171 La. 1077, 1086, 133 So. 163,
166 (1931).
Compare decisions avoiding application of article 2386 by refusing to extend
the meaning of fruits: Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 87 So. 2d 735 (1956)
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ample of judicial willingness to avoid a strict application of the
rule that a use of community funds will make the purchased
property community regardless of the intention of the parties.
Since a rule of "conversion" through the use of community
funds is seemingly based either on the theory that such use evi-
dences an intention of the paying party that the property be-
come part of the community, or on the principle that the com-
munity should be maintained inviolate and therefore uses of
community funds for non-community purposes should be penal-
ized, it is submitted that an error-of-law approach to such prob-
lems is proper. It is proper in the first instance because inten-
tion in these cases is surely misguided when formed under an
error as to the legal nature of the funds used, and in the second,
because penalties should be imposed only when it is known that
the funds utilized for separate acquisitions were community
property, and the use was undertaken regardless of this knowl-
edge.
John M. King
STATUS OF UNENDORSED INSTRUMENT
DRAWN TO MAKER'S OWN ORDER
In return for a $2,000 loan, defendant executed and delivered
to plaintiff a demand instrument payable to the order of "my-
self" which was signed and dated, but unendorsed. A $200
payment held to constitute an acknowledgment of the debt was
made one year later. Suit to recover the balance was filed some
41/ years after the partial payment; defendant excepted, plead-
ing the three-year prescription on money lent.' Plaintiff con-
tended the five-year prescription for suits on a promissory note
was applicable. 2 The trial court sustained defendant's excep-
tion, dismissing the suit, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal on rehearing affirmed. Held, an unendorsed instrument
payable to the maker's own order is not a promissory note,
(increase in value of a one-half interest in furniture business) ; and dividends:
Daigre v. Daigre, 228 La. 682, 83 So. 2d 900, 55 A.L.R.2d 951 (1956) (applies
only to cash payments and not to stock dividends).
1. "The following actions are prescribed by three years: . . .
"That for the payment of money lent . .. " LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3538 (1870).
2. Id. art. 3540: "Actions on . . . all promissory notes, whether negotiable
or otherwise, are prescribed by five years, reckoning from the day when the
engagements were payable."
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